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Partisan affiliation, or at least the recognition of a party label and its associated 
values, is a key factor in determining how an individual will cast his or her vote in 
selecting elected officials. The stronger the party affiliation and loyalty, the more likely 
the individual will vote for the parties’ candidates. Partisanship may be overt, or it may 
be exercised strategically by taking actions that on the surface appear to diverge from the 
official party position. In elections the goal of political parties is to win office. Candidates 
will appeal to partisan sentiments in order to gain the favor of voters. Flanigan and 
Zingale (1998) define partisanship as “the sense of attachment or belonging that an 
individual feels for a political party.” It is the single most important influence on political 
opinions and voting behavior. Individuals who identify themselves as being either 
Republican or Democratic respond to political information partially by using their party 
identification to orient them. They react to the latest political information in ways 
allowing it to fit with the ideals and feelings they already have. Party identification 
“raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to 
his partisan orientation.” (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960). For people 
with weak political attitudes who have some sense of partisan loyalty, party identification 
“has a more direct influence on behavior than it has among people with a well elaborated 
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view of what their choices concern.” (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960). 
Epstein (1986) notes that in the last century when educational levels were lower and there 
were limited mass communication and other sources of political information “voters 
would have few cues more helpful and meaningful than the party label.” Epstein further 
believes that that the measurable decline of party identifiers has been so modest that the 
overwhelming majority of voters retain Republican and Democratic identifications. 
Parties may be less central to the voting decision, but they provide important cues for 
voters in the absence of candidate centered appeals such as personality, issue orientation, 
or incumbency. 
Declining loyalty to a party may occur when there is a decrease in partisan 
intensity. Loyalty can also be weakened by other factors such as the attractiveness of the 
candidate, foreign and domestic policy issues, and local circumstances (Flanigan and 
Zingale, 1998). Voters may also deliberately choose not to support their party in the short 
term because they are behaving in a purposive, goal directed manner (Allison, 1971). 
They may vote for alternate choices rather than a more preferred candidate in order to 
stop another candidate that is liked less (Niemi and Weisberg, 1993). Abramson, Aldrich, 
Paolino, and Rohde (1992) find evidence of such strategic or as they call it, 
“sophisticated voting” in the 1988 National Election Survey Super Tuesday study.  
Elected legislative leaders also exhibit partisan loyalties. Republican and 
Democratic members of Congress act in ways to support their parties’ ideological 
positions while trying to undermine the position of the opposition. While partisan ties are 
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a predictor of how elected officials vote, they are expected to maintain a certain amount 
of flexibility in their views so as to prevent gridlock with the opposition and promote 
compromise in legislation. The public is not surprised to hear of numerous “deals” being 
made in order to fashion compromises on major public policies.  
In Congress, Clausen (1973) finds that party is the major explanatory variable in 
votes concerning economic regulations, government and business relations, care and use 
of natural resources, fiscal policies, agricultural assistance, social welfare programs, and 
civil rights. Partisans usually share ideologies and “for a Congressman who is at either 
end of the political spectrum, ideology is a means to array the amendments and the 
proponents on a continuum, enabling him to vote for the one nearest him.”(Kingdon, 
1981).The President’s power base in Congress is shared with those who “have the 
greatest predisposition to support his preferences, because they share with the president 
both party affiliation and an ideological outlook.” (Bond and Fleischer, 1990).  
Members of Congress have been shown to vote strategically when circumstances 
arise that make it more advantageous to vote contrary to one’s own preferences. Enelow 
and Koehler (1980) find this to be true when they examine Congressional votes that were 
designed to save losing bills and kill winning bills. Denzau and Mackay (1983) model 
sophisticated forms of committee behavior concerning the germaneness rule and the 
closed rule in the U.S. House of Representatives. Committee members’ votes are made 
with an eye towards the bill’s final fate in floor voting. Krehbiel and Rivers (1990) 
skeptically examine the theory of sophisticated voting in the context of congressional 
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rules, agendas, preferences and uncertainty. As an alternative approach, they characterize 
voting as a game illustrating the interaction of information and procedure in 
congressional activity. Finally, Calvert and Fenno (1994) examine Senate consideration 
of allowing Senate proceedings to be televised. Their model shows that even with less 
than complete information about preferences and a fixed agenda, senators still engage in 
sophisticated voting. 
Partisanship is also alive and well in the judicial branch of government. 
According to Carp and Stidham (2001) eight of the states select their judges in partisan 
elections.1 Judges who must run for office face the twin hurdles of primary and general 
elections. They are in the same predicament as any other political candidate.  They are 
concerned with getting their message out to the voters. In order to do this they must raise 
funds in order to get their message out. They must make promises to garner support and 
votes. In the primary election they are seeking the support of the party faithful by 
promising to adhere to party principles. For example, this could be the promise to “get 
tough” on crime or assist in the protection of “victim’s rights.” Such comments do not 
bode well for the alleged offender. Yet in the general election, judicial candidates also 
have to promise the voters to be fair and impartial.  
What about the federal judiciary? While its judges do not have to run for office, 
does partisanship affect them? Federal judges are born out of the political process and in 
many instances are themselves past party loyalists. Prior research in judicial decision 
                                                 
1 Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. 
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making has not addressed the issue of how partisan affiliation might affect the outcome 
of cases involving the major political parties as litigants. Because they usually concern 
First Amendment issues, these cases have always been lumped in together with “civil 
liberties” cases. Pragmatically there is a very good reason for this. Most judicial research 
is interested in how judges in general reach their decisions. In order to generalize, a large 
sample or N is required.  Focusing on one small area of interest, such as political parties, 
within the sphere of the First Amendment is not going to tell the researcher very much 
about overall trends concerning judges and their decisions.  A better approach is to 
include all case types that fall inside this sphere. However, now that these trends have 
been identified, it is important to pull out the microscope and conduct more detailed 
examinations of particular subject areas within the sphere of the First Amendment.  This 
will reveal how a particular area does, or does not compare to the established 
generalizations.  
Public law scholars know how federal judges vote as a whole on civil liberties 
cases. Liberal judges tend to support the expansion of civil liberties such as First 
Amendment freedom of speech and the related freedom of association. Ideally these are 
concerns of organized groups such as political parties. Conservative judges tend to read 
the First Amendment less expansively. The myth of judicial impartiality implies that 
judges would never let partisan loyalties sway their decisions. This may be true in most 
cases where partisan preferences are not overtly at issue, but what happens when a case 
comes before a judge that involves the judge’s own party or that of the opposition? Will a 
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Republican judge support the Republican Party and vote against the Democrats? Will a 
Democratic judge support the Democratic Party and vote against the Republicans?  
Political parties are manifestations of the freedom of association and dependent 
upon judicial interpretation for their existence and continued viability. Can it be assumed 
that a judge would automatically support his or her own party and vote against the 
opposition party in the name of partisanship and against personal ideology?  Will a 
conservative judge sacrifice ideology and vote in a sophisticated manner in order to 
expand the civil liberties of the Republicans, but remain conservative if it restricts the 
Democrats? Will a liberal judge sacrifice ideology and vote in a sophisticated manner to 
limit the civil liberties of the Republicans, or will that judge stay ideologically true and 
expand their rights?  Partisanship is alive and well in the other branches of government. 




THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES 
Of central importance to any concept of democracy are the beliefs that policy 
makers should be selected through periodic elections with unrestrictive adult suffrage; 
that candidacies are not unduly restricted; votes equally weighted; and outcomes based on 
majority preferences (McCleskey, 1984). Parties help achieve these goals by assisting in 
the governing processes through selection of officials; shaping and determining 
governmental policies; executing those policies; and when out of power, criticizing those 
who hold power. They are important in promoting such values as democratic 
responsiveness, consent of the governed, equality, public choice and political 
accountability (Ryden, 1999). Fitts (2000) believes parties perform four critical functions. 
First, they mobilize and aggregate citizens to gain control of the government. They try to 
prevail over the problems of collective action that restrict individuals from fully 
participating in and creating full democracy. Second, parties channel public debate by 
prioritizing and narrowing the discussion of issues. Third, they promote compromise and 
tradeoffs that are essential to an organization with diverse interests among many 
supporters. There is an organizational interest in maintaining a large membership that 
includes a variety of interests, but not beholden to any one narrow group.  Factions can be 
dangerous and divisive for a party seeking to gain office. Finally, parties attempt to 
define what is meant by democratic majority rule. There is no definition in the 
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Constitution saying what majority rule means. Parties take the individual rights of voters 
and collectivize them. In doing so, they are made strong by the competition between 
private political forces. 
Though essential to the functioning of government, political parties are not a part 
of the formal governmental structure. They are not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution 
and some of the Founders, as reflected in the Federalist papers, did not encourage them 
to be formed. Pritchett (1984) identifies eight separate clauses of the U.S. Constitut ion 
that are of importance to the parties. First, is Article I, Section 2, which provides that 
electors for members of the House in the several states “shall have the qualifications 
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.” In other 
words, voter qualifications are the responsibility of the states. Next is the “time, place, 
and manner” clause of Article I, Section 4, establishing when and how elections are to be 
carried out. Several of the Amendments to the Constitution relate to elections and the 
electorate. Especially relevant are the protections afforded to individuals concerning free 
speech and the freedom of association as reflected in the First Amendment. The Fifteenth 
Amendment specifically forbids the denial of the right to vote “on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude.” The Nineteenth Amendment gives women the right 
to vote. Poll taxes were invalidated under the Twenty-fourth Amendment. Finally, the 
Twenty-sixth Amendment extended the right to vote to eighteen year olds.  
While much attention is given in the literature to party structure, membership 
characteristics, ideologies, and electoral performance, often neglected is the legal context 
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in which they operate. What conditions would drive the parties from the electoral arena to 
the legal arena? Epstein and Rowland (1991) believe that groups are involved in litigation 
to win cases, gain publicity, and to maintain their membership. Members want to know 
that their group’s leaders are out fighting for the good of the organization. They want to 
know that their contributions to the party are well spent.  
Scheppele and Walker (1991) investigate litigation strategies of interest groups. 
While interest groups and parties carry out different political functions, they share 
common goals in undertaking litigation. Both groups are manifestations of associational 
interests and are goal oriented. Scheppele and Walker (1991) find that there are several 
important factors leading interest groups to seek out the courts. First, groups with more 
organizational resources (legal staffs, diffuse financial support, and longer time horizons) 
are more likely to use the courts to promote their policy goals. The Republican and 
Democratic parties are organized, structured, and well funded. They have adequate 
resources needed to undertake often long and complex legal battles in the courts. Second, 
groups engaged in structured and intense conflicts with regular opponents are more likely 
to be in court than those who operate in a consensual policy environment.  Parties by 
definition are associations of individuals with similar beliefs. Naturally, these beliefs may 
not always be consistent with others’ beliefs leading to conflict. Party goals and 
objectives may not always be in harmony with the electoral policies of the state and 
federal government requiring the parties to seek relief from the courts. Finally, Scheppele 
and Walker (1991) find that groups whose fortunes are politically sensitive will attempt 
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to protect themselves from the tumult of politics by securing their interest though legal 
precedent established by the courts. This would certainly be true of political parties which 
wax and wane in influence over time. Anything that could be done to strengthen their 
position, either as a weakened minority, or a dominant majority will be undertaken.  
The Framers of the Constitution divided and distributed power among the three 
branches of government at varying levels within the federal system. Drawn over the 
entire structure is a system of checks and balances as well as statutory restrictions at all 
levels of government. The parties are important for building consensus across the three 
branches as well as the various levels of government, but they must overcome the hurdles 
of federalism and separation of powers if they are to be effective (Ryden, 1999, 2000). 
Black (1996) and Ryden (1999) believe these restrictions affect the parties’ ability to 
nominate and promote candidates, have access to the ballot, raise funds, organize, and 
exercise other associational rights.  
Parties are essentially organizations made up of private individuals with similar 
political and ideological beliefs and were treated as such from the 1790s until the Civil 
War. After the efforts of Robert La Follette and the Progressives, parties began to be 
treated as public agencies (Black, 1996). Prior to World War II, the constitutional status 
of the parties was similar to that of non-public associations in that they could be 
subjected to governmental regulation, when the regulation furthered some sort of 
legitimate governmental interest (McCleskey, 1984). Epstein (1986) views this 
relationship as being comparable to “public utilities” in that the parties are agencies 
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which perform services in which the public has an interest sufficient to require some 
governmental oversight, along with the granting of legal privileges, but not to the extent 
that the government owns or manages the organizations’ activities. This party - 
government relationship, like all citizens - government relationships, must balance 
between governmental interest and protection of the rights of the people. For many years, 
there was “an implicit recognition of constitutional limits to state control of party 
activities” which recognized a governmental interest in running fair and efficient 
elections versus the “presumably protected rights of parties to undertake private 
associational activities.” (Epstein, 1986). 
Parties have often found themselves either as plaintiff or defendant in court 
protecting their associational rights from restrictions by state and federal governments. 
Early controversy arose when associational rights came into conflict with individual 
rights. Party activities in some areas of the country were legalized fronts for racial 
discrimination. Election officials used the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to prevent the dilution of votes and to invalidate discriminatory practices to 
the detriment of the membership interests of the parties. The Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and 
Nineteenth Amendments all authorize Congress to enforce these provisions with 
appropriate legislation. Especially significant to the political parties was the passage of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Its underlying intent is the belief that all citizens have the 
ability to participate and have their votes counted in an election. Courts had to balance 
the associational interests of the parties with the individual rights of those who were 
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being excluded from the parties or their activities. Their individual equal protection and 
voting rights outweigh any private associational rights used by members of parties to 
justify discriminatory practices (Petterson, 2000).  
Initially, there was “great reluctance” on the part of the Supreme Court to “to get 
involved in electoral problems other than those raised by racial discrimination” (Pritchett, 
1984). Federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, have had to fashion legal policy 
concerning parties in the face of the Framer’s antagonism, the absence of textual 
guidance from the Constitution, and the absence of any clearly accepted, normative 
understanding of parties and their roles and functions. There has really been no consensus 
over the years within the legal or the political science community for a constitutionally 
grounded responsible party government that would assist the Supreme Court in its 
consideration of parties. (Ryden, 2000).  
The White Primary Cases2 collectively stand for the idea that judicial intervention 
is necessary in the voting process when racial discrimination threatens that process. In 
affirming the rights of racial minorities at the expense of the associational rights of the 
white majority, the Court restricted the scope of participation and party activity. The 
White Primary Cases laid the foundation for the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In doing so, 
                                                 
2 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446 (1927) 
  Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484 (1932) 
  U.S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031 (1941) 
  Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757 (1944) 




the Court addressed questions of voting rights, ballot access, equal protection, and 
patronage issues. 
Primary elections and the party nominating process are integral steps in achieving 
public office and considered public functions and state action subject to constitutional 
scrutiny (Rotunda and Nowak, 1999). Though freedom of association is not specifically 
mentioned in the First Amendment, the Supreme Court recognized this right as 
emanating from it in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson (1958). While there are 
governmental interests in candidate selection, members of political parties have 
associational rights under the First Amendment that overcome governmental interest in 
the integrity of the election process. Consequently, parties have achieved the legal 
authority to define and control the internal party processes without state interference 
(Black, 1996). Through increased party autonomy, the courts have been able to 
“strengthen the power of the state party organizations to control the content of the party’s 
ideological message,” and have “increased their ability to influence the nomination of 
candidates.” (Black, 1996). 
Party rules on delegate selection to national conventions take precedence over 
contrary state laws and regulations. (Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 
450 U.S. 107, 1981); (Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 1975); (O’Brien v. Brown, 409 
U.S. 1, 1972. Parties possess the ability to establish and advance shared beliefs while 
insulating their internal operations from governmental regulation. Party beliefs can be 
enforced through the application of party rules. (Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 1973). 
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Additionally, parties may determine who its membership shall be and exclude those who 
do not share the party’s official ideology. (Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic 
Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 1989). States are not allowed to insert their own 
judgments for the party’s or impose upon the party’s right to select nominees who are in 
harmony with party preferences and ideologies. (Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. 
La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 1981).  
Ballot access laws determine which candidates are on the ballot on Election Day. 
Justice Stewart said these laws require candidates to have at least some “significant 
modicum of support” prior to having their names placed on the ballot for the purpose of 
“avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of democratic process at the general 
election.” (Jennes v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 1971). This would include avoidance of “bed 
sheet ballots” in which voters are faced with a dizzying array of candidates to choose 
from (McCleskey, 1984, p. 350). Ballot access cases have customarily been thought to be 
advantageous to the Democratic and Republican parties. They are allowed to promote 
primary ballot access laws that are advantageous to candidates favored by the state party 
establishment. Such laws have been held not to infringe upon the rights of party 
candidates excluded from the ballot or their supporters (Black, 1996; see also Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 1992).  
Closed primary cases concern who gets to vote in a political party primary. In 
challenging such primaries, independent groups and individuals challenge the validity of 
state run elections that exclude voters who are not “publicly professing party identifiers.” 
 15
(Epstein, 1986.) Individuals claim that their right to participate should take priority over 
party interest protected by state laws that shield the parties from such electoral 
“interlopers.” (Epstein, 1986). In general this is true, but in Tashjian v. Republican Party 
of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986), Republican Party rules allowed independent voters 
to participate in primary elections for state wide and federal offices which was contrary to 
state law. The Supreme Court held for the party’s associational rights believing that it had 
the right to expand its base in order to support its activities. The Court also has addressed 
party concerns over legislative redistricting suspected of eliminating or diluting the 
voting power of individuals associated with a party. In Davis v. Bandemer, (478 U.S. 
109, 1986), the Court determined that political gerrymandering cases were justiciable 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Finally, the Court has addressed issues concerning party affiliation in the realm of 
public employment (patronage). In general, an individual cannot be terminated or denied 
public employment because of that individual’s partisan affiliation. More specifically, the 
issue in these cases is whether a governmental employer can show that an individual’s 
partisan affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the 
public office involved. (Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 1980); (Rutan v. Republican 
Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 1990). 
Petterson (2000) believes that the Court has supported the ability of the parties to 
structure their own affairs, especially nominating procedures. In general though, he 
believes that the Court has viewed freedom of association as an individual right with 
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collective consequences. When the interests of individuals collectively suffer voting and 
representational discrimination, these come into conflict with the representational 
interests of a party and its members. When this happens, the Supreme Court sides against 
the parties and in favor of the individuals.  Ryden (2000) believes the Supreme Court has 
played a key role in the so-called “decline” of the political parties. It has “subordinated 
political parties to other collectivities (referring to minority groups) in creating a group 
right to representation in gerrymandering disputes.” The Court has distorted differences 
between independent candidates and party organizations in ballot and voter access cases. 
Until recently, the Court “generally excluded parties from discussions in campaign 
finance.” They have refused to recognize the role of party patronage in the construction 
of party organizations. In general, the Court has “reinforced a larger political culture 
increasingly hostile to political parties and their control of the electoral process and 
government. Finally, the Supreme Court “has been complicit in undermining party 
influence in favor of an individualistic, unmediated, participatory form of politics, 
making more difficult the parties’ task of reversing their fortunes.” (Ryden, 2000). 
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CHAPTER 3 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 
The Legal Model 
 
How do courts, and more specifically the judges on those courts, reach their 
decisions? Of particular interest is whether or not partisanship affects how judges vote? 
The traditional view of judicial decision-making is the legal model. It holds that judges 
base their decisions upon the facts of the case and apply the applicable law. Of central 
importance to the decision making process are the plain meaning of statutes and 
constitutions, respect and adherence to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution or of 
the legislature, precedent, and the balancing of societal interests (Segal and Spaeth, 1993; 
Brace and Hall, 1995). In this view, judges exercise little or no discretion in the decision 
making process. They do not speak but rather, the laws speak through them. Judicial 
decisions are merely applied to the law objectively, dispassionately, and impartially. The 
legal model holds that partisanship has no place in the courtroom or in the decision 
making process. For many judges and lawyers, if asked whether they were or would be 
influenced by their political party affiliation when rendering decisions, they would 
respond, “after taking the sacred judicial oath and donning the black robes, the judge is 
no longer a Democrat or a Republican.” (Carp and Rowland, 1983.) Prior partisan 
orientations ideally are put aside as the judge enters a new realm where judicial decisions 
are the “product of precedent, argumentation, and wit, rather than such base factors as the 
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judge’s background, personality, or political party affiliation.” (Carp and Rowland, 
1983). This approach has been drilled into the heads of most law students and constantly 




Behaviorialists have a different point of view concerning factors influencing 
judicial decisions. The attitudinal model posits judicial decisions based upon the facts of 
the case viewed in light of the attitudes and values of the individual judge. (Segal and 
Spaeth, 1993). Judges act in ways to achieve case outcomes “most proximate to their 
individual policy preferences.” (Brace and Hall, 1995).  
Some believe that partisanship does play a role in the decision making process of 
judges. Nagel (1964) establishes a relationship between party affiliations and the judicial 
decision making process. Democratic judges, when compared to their Republican 
colleagues on the same court during the same time period and comparing voting patterns 
on the same cases are more liberal and prone to favor: (1) the defense in criminal cases; 
(2) the administrative agency in business regulation cases; (3) the private party in non - 
business regulation cases; (4) the claimant in unemployment compensation cases; (5) the 
broadening of free speech rights in First Amendment cases; and (6) the finding of a 
constitutional violation in “criminal - constitutional” cases. Goldman (1966) finds 
Democratic judges, as a whole, have higher liberalism scores than Republicans. He 
qualifies his findings in that it appears that Democratic and Republican judges may be 
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equally liberal on criminal and civil liberties categories, but that Democrats are more 
liberal when it came to economic matters. Goldman (1975) revisits this issue and 
determines that there are even greater differences between Republican and Democratic 
judges in civil liberties, criminal justice, and political liberalism issues. Of the 
background variables for party, age, religion, prior judicial experience, tenure on the 
court, and prior prosecutorial experience, Goldman finds that the party variable is the 
single most important. Adamany (1969) hypothesizes that if judges are party identifiers 
before they come on the bench, there is a basis for believing that the judges, like 
members of the legislature, are affected in their issue orientations by partisan affiliation. 
Additionally, he believes that since judges are better educated, they have stronger 
partisan identification. Policy preferences of the judges in legal issues are cast in 
ideological terms. This allows the judge to have clearer perceptions of issues and the 
party position on those issues. Judicial decisions are then based in ways that are 
consistent with the position of the party. Adamany recognizes that party identification is 
probably one of many factors that affect how a judge votes. He suggests that 
psychological dispositions and socializing process might also be at work. These include 
procedural rules, case facts, legal education and training, and “other judicial beliefs and 
attitudes.” Feeley (1971) however, warns not to be too simplistic in the relationship 
between party affiliation and subsequent voting patterns in that it may not work in all 
types of judicial voting scenarios.  
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Tate (1981) finds that liberal justices on the Supreme Court favor, among other 
things, the claimant in civil rights cases. Conservative justices are generally opposed to 
the granting of a claimed civil right. He additionally finds that party identification is 
important as well as prior career experiences of the justice. Non-prosecutors are more 
favorable to civil liberties claims than prosecutors. Justices with prior judicial experience 
are more favorable towards civil liberties claims than those without.  
Tate and Handberg (1991) hypothesize that political factors such as the justice’s 
partisanship and the intentions of the appointing President when making the judicial 
appointment could be factors involved in the judicial decision making process. An 
ideologically conscious President might be more inclined to appoint “like minded party 
mates to the Supreme Court.” Tate and Handberg conclude that a “justice’s partisanship 
and appointing President’s intent ions are positively related to civil rights and liberties 
liberalism.”  
Of all the background variables measured by Carp and Rowland (1983) 
concerning judicial decision making, political party affiliation is found to be the “best” 
predictor of judicial behavior. Gibson (1991) finds that judges have enormous discretion 
when rendering a decision. Of the many factors involved, judges rely on their own 
ideological positions in making their decisions. Judges’ decisions are a function of what 
they prefer to do in any given legal setting. Liberal and conservative judges will do all 
that they can to render decisions that are in keeping with their values and experiences. If 
necessary they will cloak their preferences in the name of precedent, stare decisis, strict 
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constructionism, activism, and restraint, if it will serve their particular point of view. 




Rowland and Carp (1996) theorize that cognitive processes account for individual 
differences and similarities in the perception, memory, and inferential interpretation of 
information by judges. They reject the axioms that judicial decisions are necessarily goal 
oriented or that they are motivated by personal policy preferences. Instead, their social 
cognition theory characterizes attitudes and other affective elements of human choices as 
influences on the evaluation of information rather than as crude indicators of motives that 
directly influence behavior, such as attitudes and policy preferences.  Judges are 
“cognitive misers,” meaning that they “rely on long term memories to compensate for the 
limitations” of short-term memories.  Stored episodic and impressionistic knowledge or 
“schema” is a cognitive structure of organized prior knowledge, abstracted from 
experience with specific instances that anchors the processing of new information and the 
retrieval of stored information.  In other words, past experiences give them a point of 
reference in evaluating the merits of a case. Judges politically involved before their 
appointment may be expected to have richer, more complex political schemata than the 
general public. A judicial cognitive approach would expect that judges, who were 
recruited on the basis of political experience, would perceive, remember, and interpret 
evidentiary and legal cues through highly affective schematic lenses. In other words, 
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prior political experience as an elective or appointed official would influence a judge’s 




Baum (1997) believes that judges take positions that mirror their conceptions of 
desirable public policy. He believes judges vote “sincerely” when they cast a vote which 
supports case outcomes and doctrines preferred by the judge. They do not take into 
consideration the impact of their vote on the collective result in their court, higher courts, 
or other political institutions. They automatically support the solution closest to their 
“ideal” point. In a sense, this appears to be somewhat akin to the attitudinal model. Baum 
(1997) also believes that at times, a judge may vote strategically. Here judges take into 
consideration “the effect of their choices on the collective results when they vote on 
outcomes and write or support opinions. They do so in order to achieve the most 
desirable results in their own court and in government as a whole. Because of this 
motivation, the positions they take may differ from the positions that they prefer most.”  
Strategic voting by judges is calculated behavior that takes place “whenever they take 
actions intended to advance their policy goals in collective decisions of their own court or 
in the decisions of other institutions.” (Baum, 1997). Basically strategic judicial voting is 
similar to what a legislator does in order to get a particular policy though. He or she may 
have to compromise. Judges may realize that if they take a position and write opinions 
that are too broad, narrow, conservative, or liberal, they may have problems building 
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some sort of consensus on their court. Additionally, they may be writing an opinion in a 
way to avoid reversal by a higher court such as the Supreme Court. They may also be 
writing the opinion that interprets legislation with an eye towards the reaction of 
Congress, or possibly even public opinion. 
 Epstein and Knight (1998) believe that justices make decisions due to the primacy 
of policy preferences. They want to see their policy preferences made into law. They 
believe that while Supreme Court Justices are chiefly interested in making legal policy, 
“they are not unconstrained actors who make decisions based only on their own 
ideological attitudes.” In other words, Supreme Court decision making is not limited to 
the constraints of the attitudinal model. Justices are “strategic actors.” Their objectives 
depend upon consideration of other actors, such as Congress, as well as other members of 
the Court. Individuals make rational decisions, but this is often contingent upon what 
other actors are also doing or are expected to do. The strategic account is goal oriented. 
When faced with a Solomon-like decision, the judge will select an outcome most likely to 
achieve their desired goal, or as close to it as possible, given the context and implications 
of the decision. Judicial decision making, especially in a collegial court such as the 
Supreme Court is interdependent upon the actions and preferences of other judges and 
political actors. Sincere preferences, much like Baum (1997), reflect the true feeling of 
the judge. Sophisticated preferences may require the judge to take a position that does not 
accurately reflect the judge’s true feeling on an issue. This is done to avoid the possibility 
of seeing colleagues reject a judge's most preferred policy in favor of one that is least 
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preferred by the judge. In other words, the judge has to compromise to at least get part of 
his or her preferences translated into judicial policy. Additionally, judges must take into 
account the reactions of other branches of government such as the Congress and the 
president. Failing to take into account the actions of other actors and the actions they are 





Prior Research on Partisan Affiliation and its Influence on Court Decisions 
 
Epstein and Hadley (1990) focus upon the success rates of major and minor 
political parties in litigation before the Supreme Court. They suggest that the Supreme 
Court acts on behalf of the major parties, however they do not address the issue of 
partisan affiliation and whether or not it is influential. Lloyd’s (1995) central concern is 
whether party labels reflect a different influence on decisions from partisan reference 
group attachments. He finds that federal district court judges sitting on three member 
panels in reapportionment cases have a greater probability of voting against any partisan 
reapportionment plan than over non-partisan plans. Judges take either a conscious or 
unconscious note of the political party controlling the state legislature drawing up 
reapportionment plans. Cases involving legislative reapportionment plans drawn up in 
legislatures controlled by the party opposite that of the judge are more likely to be struck 
down than non-partisan plans. Same party reapportionment plans, among all partisan 
plans, are less likely to be voted against. Lloyd’s work comes closest so far in trying to 
determine the role of partisanship in judicial decision-making. What this examination 
does is take this a step further by determining what judges will do when their own or the 
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opposing political party is involved in the litigation before them. This should provide a 
clearer test than was examined by Lloyd.  
 
The Federal Court of Appeals 
 
This research examines voting decisions of United States Courts of Appeals cases 
involving the Republican and Democratic parties. McCleskey (1984) believes that the 
political parties’ transformation in the constitutional system began in the 1960s. This was 
the time period the civil rights movement was gaining momentum and many courts were 
forced to address important civil rights and liberties questions As such, this analysis 
extends from 1966 through the end of 1997. Prior to this time few cases existed 
concerning the two major political parties. Some cases from the late Eighteenth century 
as well as the Nineteenth century were discovered, but were not included in this analysis.  
In general, much of the literature on American judicial studies revolves around 
the Supreme Court. Less research has been conducted upon the various United States 
Courts of Appeal, federal District Courts and the many state trial and appellate courts. 
This is especially evident in the lack of any kind of empirical analysis, great or small, 
concerning partisanship influences in cases involving the Republican and Democratic 
parties. The federal Courts of Appeal occupy an important place in the American judicial 
system. They help to promote uniformity of national laws and legal principles within 
their respective jurisdictions. They are also vital interpreters of the law in an era when the 
Supreme Court is issuing fewer full opinions. Songer (1991) notes the Supreme Court 
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reviews less than one of two thousand decisions from the federal district courts. Baum 
(2001) notes that in the 1998 term, just over 7,100 were filed with the Supreme Court. 
The chances that a case will make it all the way to the Supreme Court and that the Court 
will entertain oral arguments and issue a full written opinion are quite small.  Table 1 
shows the decreasing numbers of cases disposed of by the Supreme Court utilizing full 
opinions since 1992.  
Federal Courts of Appeal handle thousand of cases each year reviewing lower 
court decisions on evidentiary matters, jury instructions, and other routine procedural 
questions. These courts have the opportunity to fashion public policy by interpreting 
various pieces of legislation, administrative actions, as well as interpreting words and 
terms found in the U.S. Constitution, treaties, and federal laws. In doing so they must 
progress beyond simply applying the law to the facts as is championed by the legal model 
of judicial making. They must give meaning to the words of the law calling upon their 
attitudes, ideologies, past experiences, as well as legal expertise to render a decision. 
 Cases filed in federal appellate courts have steadily increased over the years. 
Table 2 reflects the growth of the caseload for various years since 1960. 
 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals do not have a discretionary docket. Unlike the 
Supreme Court, lower federal courts must hear all appeals from below and deal with error 
correction and sometimes policy formulation. The kinds of cases heard in these courts 
generally reflect the kinds of disputes that are being addressed by the federal judicial 
system. The federal Courts of Appeal are “more akin to a referee of disputes between 
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litigants.” (Songer, Sheehan, and Haire, 2000). These scholars believe that court 
decisions may have important policy consequences, but most only impact the litigants in 
a particular case. Caseloads vary as social conditions vary. Social development theory 
holds that as populations grow and change and as society becomes more complex, more 
disputes occur, and more cases are filed in court. Courts must adjust and react to the 
social and economic conditions as presented to them in litigation. Judicial power cannot 
be invoked unless there are at least two parties in disagreement and a case or controversy 
exists. Hypothetical opinions by the courts are not allowed.  
Songer, Sheehan, and Haire (2000) further believe that political contexts and issue 
agendas have risen as a result of increased interest group activities in federal courts. 
Lawmaking by administrative agencies charged with implementation of Congressional 
policies has also increased the amount of litigation. The legal environment has also 
affected the growth of federal cases. This is in part due to changes in the composition and 
policy attitudes of the Supreme Court. As the high court creates new doctrines, waves of 
new litigants flock to the courthouse, grievances in hand.  
Songer, Sheehan, and Haire (2000) finally note that the types of cases presented 
to the federal courts have changed over the years. Table 3 reflects the changes in the 
judicial business of the U.S. Courts of Appeal. 
 
Attention to private law economic issues has fallen over time, but economic 
issues involving the government as a party are relatively stable. The number of criminal 
cases has risen. The authors attribute this to greater access to legal counsel on federal 
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appeal brought about by the Criminal Justice Act of 1964; decisional trends of the 
Warren Court; and an increase in state and federal habeas corpus cases. Civil rights cases 
have increased because of the Warren Court’s interpretations of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; federal civil rights legislation of the 1960’s and 
1970’s; and judicial reinterpretation of Reconstruction era civil rights legislation. Civil 
liberties cases have increased because of a shift of emphasis by the Supreme Court 
towards the First Amendment as well as a number of appeals under the Freedom of 
Information Act. These are all areas of special interest to the political parties.  
After losing at the initial trial, many claim that they will fight their case all the 
way to the Supreme Court in order to remedy a grave injustice. Realistically though, most 
appeals will stop with review in the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court handles the 
major cases and sets the legal policies for the rest of the lower courts to follow. It has 
done so in many cases involving the political parties, but it simply cannot issue 
substantive opinions on all of the issues presented to it for review. Justices on the 
Supreme Court can generally pick and choose which cases they want to review and party 
issues may not be a high priority for them. This is not the situation with the Courts of 
Appeals. If a trial court renders a decision and one or both of the litigants wants to 
appeal, they have that right. Appeals are also made from decisions rendered by 
governmental agencies such as the Federal Elections Commission or the Federal 
Communications Commission. If someone or group is unhappy with a decision, it can be 
appealed to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right. 
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  There is a popular misconception that judges are somehow immune from 
politics. They are, however, creatures of politics. Many states select their judges through 
partisan elections that can be as colorful and controversial as any election for a more 
“political” position as president, member of Congress, or a state office. Merit selection of 
state judges is no less political. Selection of federal judges is also political. Presidents 
seek to find nominees that share similar political values as themselves.  In selecting 
names for possible appointment they seek the guidance of senators and other elected 
official with similar partisan beliefs over which potential nominees to select.  Possibly 
these nominees are legal scholars, but they may also be loyal party members waiting to 
be rewarded for their faithfulness. When the president and the Senate are of the same 
party there may be more of an opportunity for the president to put in more like-minded 
nominees. If faced with a Senate controlled by the opposition party, he may have to find 





There are no databases specifically dedicated to cases involving political parties. 
Epstein and Hadley (1990) ran a search on LEXIS™  (© 2002 LexisNexis, a division of 
Reed Elsevier Inc., www.lexisnexis.com), a legal information retrieval system, of 500 
names of political parties they had gathered for their study of political parties in litigation 
before the Supreme Court. Since this study involves only the Republican and Democratic 
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parties, I searched for all U.S. Court of Appeals cases on LEXIS  that contained any of 
the following combinations of words in the opinion or in the style of the case:  
“Republican Party,” “ Democratic Party,” “Republican State Committee,” 
“Democratic State Committee,” “Republican National Committee,” 
“Democratic National Committee,” “County Republican,” “County 
Democratic,” “Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee,” 
“Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,” “National Republican 
Congressional Committee,” “National Republican Senatorial Committee,” 
“Democratic,” and finally “Republican” 
 
This search yielded 70 cases listed in Appendix B.  Subject matter for each case 
fell into the following areas: party maintenance (22 cases), delegate selection (14 cases), 
ballot access (11 cases), finance and expenditures (8 cases), patronage (6 cases), 
redistricting (3 cases), and racial discrimination (6 cases).  For each case, information 
was gathered on whether one or both of the parties were involved in the litigation and 
whether the parties were plaintiffs or defendants in the case. I also determined whether or 
not the state or federal government was involved in the litigation and their status as a 
plaintiff or defendant. The unit of analysis was each judge’s vote. Most cases involved 
panels of at least 3 judges, generating three separate observations. Some cases involved 
en banc decisions allowing for more observations to be made. There are a total of 246 
separate observations. 
Most of the judges deciding the cases were sitting circuit judges for their 
respective circuit. Some of the judges were senior circuit court judges from the circuit, or 
other senior judges sitting by designation from the other circuits. There were a few 
district judges, usually senior judges, from various federal district courts throughout the 
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country. They were not necessarily judges from within the geographic boundaries of the 
particular circuit court deciding the case. The particular status or designation of the judge 
did not matter. A federal judge, whether on the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or 
District Court level is still appointed by the president, confirmed by the Senate, and life 
tenured. Where they happen to be sitting in judgment did not affect how I went about my 
analysis. They had equal voting power when deciding a case. A judge from the United 
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation, heard one case. The 
vote was counted because the judge’s party affiliation was available. When the vote was 
cast he was lawfully sitting as judge for the Court of Appeals. 
Party affiliation of most of the judges was obtained from the Zuk, Barrow, & 
Gryski Appellate Court Data Set. Others were found utilizing the 1992 edition of the  
Almanac of the American Judiciary. Party affiliation was not readily apparent for all 
judges. Some of the data clearly indicated that the judge was a Democrat or a Republican. 
If not clearly indicated their biographies were searched to determine if they had had 
served in any type of capacity with a party. Some were members of their local county 
committee or their state committee. Others’ party affiliation was determined by prior 




                                                 
3 Judge Fahy of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, while not listed as a Republican or Democrat, 
served in various capacities in the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, most notably as 
Solicitor General of the United States in the early 1940s. Based on this information, a guess was made that 




Partisan affiliation of judges affects their votes in cases in which the Republican 
or Democratic parties are litigants. Since political party affiliation is found to be the 
“best” predictor of judicial behavior judges should be more inclined to support their own 
party in any given case and less inclined to support the opposition party. In cases 
involving the parties as litigants, judges are placed in a unique position because they are 
called upon to render decisions affecting their own party or the opposition party. 
Partisanship will influence their decision. Republican judges will be more supportive of 
cases involving the Republican Party and less supportive of cases involving the 
Democratic Party (H1).  Democratic judges will be more supportive of cases involving 
the Democratic Party, while being less supportive of cases involving the Republican 
Party (H2).   
 Initially, cross tabulations were carried out to test the validity of these statements.  
Each vote is coded (1) whenever a judge votes in favor of his or her party or against the 
opposition party. Such a vote promotes the interest of the judges' own party and deters 
the actions of the opposition. This is labeled in Table 4 as “Partisan Vote.” A vote is 
coded (0) and labeled “Contra-partisan” whenever a judge votes against his or her own 
party or in favor of the opposition party. Such an act would hamper the interests of the 
judge's own party and promote the interests of the opposition.  
Table 4 shows the results of the partisan votes cast by both Democratic and 
Republican judges.     
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As is clearly evident and not surprising, federal Courts of Appeals judges vote in a 
partisan manner when it comes to cases dealing with the two major political parties. 
Overall, judges voted in a partisan manner in 57% of the cases and in a contrary manner 
in 43% of the cases. Republican judges voted in partisan manner in 56% of the votes, and 
in a contrary manner in 44% of the votes. Democratic judges voted in a partisan manner 
at a slightly higher rate of 58% of the votes and in a contrary manner in 42% of the votes.  
 Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 each examine vote patterns for all judges when the 
Democratic and Republican parties were involved in the litigation either as a plaintiff or 
as defendant. In all scenarios, a majority of the votes were done so in a partisan manner. 
Republican judges supported their own party’s interests and voted against the interests of 
the Democrats. Not surprisingly, Democratic judges voted for their own party and against 
the Republicans.  
Only looking at the voting habits of all judges in the sample does not reveal the 
voting habits of the judges when their own party or the opposition is involved in the case. 
To better examine this concept, the votes were sorted in order to allow a closer 
examination of Democratic and Republican judges’ preferences.  Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 
examine the voting records of Democratic judges in dealing with their own party as 
plaintiff or defendant as well as the Republican Party as plaintiff or defendant.  
 Table 9 reveals that Democratic judges are more supportive of their own party 
when acting as a plaintiff. If they are acting in a truly partisan manner when deciding 
 35
these cases, this is not surprising. Nothing else would matter but the position of the party. 
Note however that the finding is not statistically significant. 
 Table 10 clearly and significantly indicates that Democratic judges act in a 
partisan manner when their own party is being sued. This is true in 70% of the cases in 
which the party was the defendant. They certainly circle the wagons when being 
challenged. As a cautionary note though, the Pearson’s r indicates that while significant 
and that partisanship does play some role, it is not a large one. There are probably other 
factors involved.  
 
 Table 11 reflects how well Democratic judges treated the Republican Party when 
acting as plaintiff.  Again, Democratic judges acted in a partisan manner. This means that 
when given the opportunity, they were able to vote against the Republican Party and deny 
their claims.  The Pearson’s r is stronger, but the model’s fit reflected in the Chi squared 
coefficient is below the critical value of 3.84 needed for significance.  
Interestingly, Table 12 indicates Democratic judges are more likely to vote in a 
contra partisan manner when the Republican Party is a defendant in litigation. This means 
that the Democratic judges will try and support the Republican Party when they are being 
sued. Perhaps this is a refection of Democratic judges’ more liberal tendency to support 
First Amendment Rights. In this case, the party label would not matter. What would 
matter was that a group, happening to be the Republican Party, was being threatened. 
Democratic and consequentially more liberal leaning judges would be more protective of 
 36
a group’s associational rights.  As party players, they may also be acting strategically. 
They could be thinking if they endanger the rights of the Republican Party institutionally, 
they could be endangering the ability of their own party to express itself and its values. 
This model fit is better, approaches significance at the 0.05 level, and has a higher 
Pearson’s r. 
Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16 reflect the voting patterns of Republican judges. Table 
13 indicates that Republican judges act in a partisan manner against the Democrats when 
litigating as plaintiffs.  They have no problem in voting against the Democrats. Here they 
are acting as pure partisans.  
 Table 14 reflects that Republican judges will act in a contra-partisan when the 
Democratic Party is being sued. This means they are more inclined to vote for the 
Democrats. Why would they do this? Possibly, they as party players, recognize the 
importance of the role of parties in the American political system. Any harm done to the 
Democrats might also be applied to the Republicans some day in another case. Instead of 
acting as partisans, they are acting strategically in trying to support political parties as an 
institution.   
 Table 15 indicates significantly that Republicans do not vote to support their party 
as plaintiffs. This may be done to avoid the appearance of bias in the support of their 
parties’ litigation.  They do not want to appear as activists on behalf of the party.  
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 Table 16 very significantly shows that when Republican interests are being 
threatened as defendants in a lawsuit, the party can count on their judges to support them. 
While they are less inclined to get involved as activist judges in support of their party as 
plaintiffs, they have no problem in protecting the party as defendants. Party supporters 
will approvingly look at the decision made by these “wise” judges in helping out the 
interests of their party. Below the surface however, the judges may again be acting 
strategically on behalf of both parties. What is bad for one party can be bad for both 
political parties.  
These findings only examine one aspect of a multidimensional problem however. 
Voting decision by judges does not exist in a vacuum. Party membership is one aspect of 
the decision making process, but it is important to see how it measures up under more 
rigorous analysis.  
I propose the following model of judicial decision-making involving political 
parties: 
PARVOTE = a + β1 JPID + β2 Region + β3 PSGOV + β4 PFGOV   
+ β5 FEDGOVP + β6 FEDGOVD + β7 STATGOVP + β8 STATGOVD  
+ β9 DEMP + β10 DEMD + β11 REPP + β12 REPD +µ, where: 
PARVOTE = the probability of a judge casting a partisan vote 
 
JPID = the judge’s party affiliation  
 
REGION = whether the judge was from the South or not 
 
PSGOV = prior state government experience 
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PFGOV = prior federal government experience 
 
FEDGOVP = federal government as plaintiff 
 
FEDGOVD = federal government as defendant 
 
STATGOVP = state government as plaintiff 
 
STATGOVD = state government as defendant 
 
DEMP = Democratic Party plaintiff 
 
DEMD = Democratic Party defendant 
 
REPP = Republican Party plaintiff 
 





Dependent variable. The dependent variable for the model is the judge’s vote, “Partisan 
Vote.” This variable predicts the likelihood that the judge will cast a partisan vote in 
favor of his or her party, or against the opposition. Each vote is coded (1) whenever a 
judge voted in favor of his or her party or against the opposition party. Such a vote would 
promote the interest of the judges' own party or deter the actions of the opposition. A vote 
is coded (0) and labeled “Contra-partisan” whenever a judge votes against his or her own 
party or in favor of the opposite party. Such an act would hamper the interests of the 
judge's own party and promote the interests of the opposition.  
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, the analysis utilizes a Logit 
regression model. (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). Pampel (2000) believes there are several 
 39
conceptual problems with linear regression and dichotomous dependent variables. By 
definition, probabilities have maximum and minimum values of 1 and 0. However, a 
linear regression line can extend upwards towards positive infinity as the values of the 
independent variables change indefinitely, or towards infinity. Depending on the slope of 
the line and observed X values, a model’s predictive values for the dependent variable 
can be above 1 or below 0. As such, the values make no sense and are of little predictive 
use. Regression assumes additivity; the effect of one variable on the dependent variable 
stays the same regardless of the levels of the other independent variables. A dichotomous 
dependent variable most likely violates the additivity for all combinations of the 
independent variables. If the value of any one of the independent variables is high enough 
to push the probability of the dependent variable to near 1 or 0, then the other 
independent variables cannot have much influence. The ceiling and the floor make the 
influence of all of the independent variables nonadditive and interactive.  
Second, Pampel believes that linear regression with a dummy dependent variable 
violates the assumptions of normality. This results because there are only two observed 
values for the dependent variable, 1 and 0. Normality is the normal distribution of error 
values around the predicted Y which are associated with each X value. The dispersion of 
the error values for each X value is the same. The assumption of normality implies 
normal and similarly dispersed error distributions. With a dummy variable only two Y 
values and only two residuals exist for any single X value. The distribution of any errors 
for any X value cannot be normal when the distribution has only two values.  
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Third, Pampel believes that regression with a dummy dependent variable violates 
the assumption of homoscedasticity. The variance of the errors is not constant when using 
linear regression for dichotomous dependent variables. While sample estimates of 
regression coefficients are unbiased, they are inefficient in that they no longer have the 
smallest variance and sample estimates of standard errors are biased. Standard errors in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity will be incorrect and test of significance will not be 
valid. Weighting the least squares does not eliminate the conceptual problems of 
nonlinearity and nonadditivity and the use of regression with a dummy dependent 
variable remains inappropriate. Logit is a regression on a dependent variable that 
“transforms nonlinear relationships into linear relationships.” (Pampel, 2000). The 
process defines the relationship between the independent variables and a distribution of 
probabilities defined by a dichotomous dependent variable. The model provides 
maximum likelihood estimates (MLE’s) of the impact of the independent variables upon 
the dependent variable to be calculated. In other words, each independent variable will in 




 Republican judges will be more supportive of cases involving the Republican 
Party and less supportive of cases involving the Democratic Party. (H1) 
 
 Democratic judges will be more supportive of cases involving the Democratic 
Party, while being less supportive of cases involving the Republican Party. (H2) 
 
 Southern judges, regardless of party affiliation, will be less supportive of political 
parties in the expansion or preservation of their rights. (H3) 
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 Judges with prior experience as elected officials will be more supportive of their 
respective parties and political parties in general.  (H4) 
 
 Judges with prior experience as an appointed official will be more supportive of 
their respective parties and political parties in general. (H5) 
 
 Judges will be more inclined to rule against federal or state governments whether 




Independent Variables. The independent variables each reflect both personal attributes of 
the judges as well as contextual variables of the case. The first independent variable is the 
judges’ party affiliation and is coded (0) for Republican and (1) for Democrat. If judges 
are purely partisan players then they will be supportive of their respective parties and will 
try to work against the opposition party. Republican judges will be more supportive of 
cases involving the Republican Party and less supportive of cases involving the 
Democratic Party. (H1). Democratic judges will be more supportive of cases involving 
the Democratic Party, while being less supportive of cases involving the Republican 
Party. (H2). 
Tate (1981) and Songer and Davis (1990) include a region variable in their work. 
A region variable is included in this analysis to determine if judges in either the Northern 
or Southern region of the United States are more or less inclined to support the parties. 
Regional variations may influence the judicial decision making process (Rowland and 
Carp, 1996). Southern judges have been found to be less supportive of defendants in 
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criminal cases (Rowland, Carp, and Stidham, 1984) and more conservative on civil rights 
(Stidham and Carp, 1982). It may be that they are less supportive of political parties in 
the expansion or preservation of their rights. (H3). Judges were coded (1) if they were 
from the South and (0) if otherwise. 3 
If Tate (1981) as well as Rowland and Carp (1996) are correct in their assertions 
that party identification, prior career experience, and prior political experience of a judge 
are important, it is reasonable to assume that past political experience (state or federal) as 
an elected or appointed official should increase the loyalty to one’s own party. Included 
in the determination of prior government experience was whether or not the judge had 
served in an elected position such as a mayor, county official, state or federal legislator, 
judge or prosecutor, or served in an appointed position such as an assistant district 
attorney, or cabinet level secretary or undersecretary. As a previously elected official, the 
individual judge has first hand experience with the electoral process. He or she had to go 
through the process of making political contacts within the party, raising funds, 
campaigning, and surviving a primary election, as well as the general election. As a 
candidate they must at least portray an image that they are loyal to their party and its 
principles. They must act or promise to act in a manner consistent with their party’s 
position. While the parties may play a less involved role in the recruitment of candidates, 
                                                 
3 In determining whether a state was from the South, I followed Rowland and Carp’s (1996) practice of 
including those states that constituted the old Confederate states and whose predominant cultural 
socioeconomic character has been southern. These states include: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.  
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campaign strategies and fund raising, they can make a difference in drawing candidates 
into highly contested races and providing connections to financial resources. They assist 
in voter mobilization tasks targeted towards actual and potential party supporters. 
(Frendreis and Gitelson, 1999). Judges with elective office backgrounds learn to become 
party players in order to win election or reelection to office. These attributes should carry 
over into their judgeships. These judges will be more supportive of their respective 
parties and more inclined to support a political party in general. (H4). Similarly, judges 
with prior experience as an appointed official may have attained their position as a result 
of party connections and past service to a party and its candidates. These judges should 
be more supportive of their parties and political parties in general when involved in 
litigation. (H5) 
Included are variables that take into account the litigant status of the federal 
government (plaintiff/defendant), state governments (plaintiff/defendant), and the 
Republican and Democratic parties (plaintiff/defendant). Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 
(2000) are interested in who wins and loses in the courts of appeals and for what reasons? 
They believe that litigants will be more successful in the Courts of Appeals if they are, in 
Galanter’s (1974) definition, “repeat players.” Repeat players are those litigants who 
regularly appear before the courts and as a result of their expertise and experience, 
prevail over those who appear less frequently and who are known as “one-shotters.” 
Repeat players can select cases that they feel will be successful in litigation. They also 
have the ability to forum shop for the most favorable venues for their disputes to be 
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resolved. Repeat players are also well financed and can bear the high costs associated 
with lengthy and complex litigation. Federal and state governments, as well as the 
Republican and Democratic parties, are such players.  
What will happen when repeat players go against each other? There still has to be 
a winner. Either the parties will win in a suit involving the government (federal or state) 
or they will lose. The government too will either be a winner or loser. Willison (1986) 
suggests that conservative judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia may in general be more supportive of a conservative administration's 
regulatory policies. Democratic members of the same court appear to be less willing to 
uphold the positions of agencies acting under the auspices of a Republican 
administration. Songer and Sheehan (1992) find that federal agencies were generally 
more successful in appeals taken before U.S. Courts of Appeals. Humphries and Songer 
(1999) believe that federal agencies may be more successful in federal courts of appeals 
because the direction of the agencies’ policy decision is congruent with the policy 
preferences of the majority of the reviewing court. Judges are more likely to uphold the 
agency’s position if that the position is consistent with the policy preferences of the 
judges. If it is inconsistent, then Court of Appeals judges are more inclined to reverse the 
decision. The judges are policy oriented and attempt to harmonize their own policy 
preferences with the agencies’ but feel constrained to pursue their preferences within 
limits set by law. The courts are responsive to the law, even though the law does not 
always dictate an unambiguous resolution of every case. In other words, a liberal judge 
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will still try to uphold a liberal decision, etc., but can only go so far in doing so and then 
has to conform to precedent. Humphries and Songer (1999) find that as Supreme Court 
precedent shifts in a conservative direction, the decision patterns of both conservative and 
liberal federal appeals court panels will become more conservative. This is true even 
though the probability of a liberal decision remains greater if the panel is composed of 
liberal judges. 
Despite these findings, I believe that the judge’s partisan ties will be stronger than 
their support of the government. The Federal Election Commission or various state 
governments brought many of the cases in this study against the political parties. In 
deciding a case, Gibson (1991) notes that there is an “expectation that asks judges to do 
what is legally proper rather than what they prefer on ideological grounds.” Judges must 
be able to vote contrary to their personal political values. I submit that this will be very 
hard to do when a judge is faced with a decision involving the judge’s own political 
party. A judge cannot recuse him or herself because of partisanship in a case concerning 
the parties. If so, the parties would never be able to find judges to hear their cases. In 
cases involving the parties, judges, regardless of their party affiliation, will behave as 
activists, or one who tends to rely more on his or her own values in rendering a decision. 
Their interests are in protecting the rights of the parties from encroachments and 
restrictions by state and federal government. As such, judges will be more inclined to rule 
against federal or state governments whether they are involved in litigation as plaintiffs 





 The first model examines votes made by both Republican and Democratic judges 
as a whole. There appears to be some evidence that partisanship does play a role in the 
judicial decision making process. Table # 17 displays the results of the model. 
Litigant status is important in the model. When either the Democratic or 
Republican parties are defendants in legal proceedings, federal appellate court judges are 
more likely to cast partisan votes supporting the political parties.  Both Democratic and 
Republican defendants are significant (Democrats 0.029; Republicans, 0.082).  This 
indicates that the judges as a whole are more protective of the status of the parties. As 
partisans, either consciously or unconsciously, they rise up to protect the interests of the 
parties when they are being threatened. 
The fact that both parties are being protected as defendants is of interest. This 
may indicate that judges, regardless of their ideology are party players who recognize the 
roles parties play in our system of government. A Democratic judge will protect the 
interest of not only the Democratic Party, but also those of the Republicans. The same 
goes for a Republican judge.  
Approaching significance in this model is the status of government in the 
litigation. When the federal government is the pla intiff the judges are more inclined to 
cast a partisan vote supportive of the parties. (significance 0.116). To a lesser extent, 
when the federal government is the defendant, the judges are still more inclined to 
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support the parties (significance 0.129). Either way, the judges are more inclined to 
support the parties over the interests of the federal government. This is also the case when 
state governments are involved as defendants in a case (significance 0.187). It may be 
that the judges will support the parties’ efforts to fight off unwanted state regulations that 
restrict the activities of the parties.  
What is interesting in this model is that personal attributes of the judges do not 
appear to be significant. Partisan affiliation also does not appear to be of consequence. 
Prior political experience either as an elected official or as an appointed official does not 
influence the judge’s voting decision. As such, there is little support for the social 
cognitive model.  The region variable is also not significant. Caution is advised in 
accepting the results indicated in Table 17, however.  The Chi 2 indicates that the effects 
may be purely random in nature.  The Pseudo R2 is extremely low (.03) meaning that 
very little of the variance is explained. 
I was also interested in determining whether or not judges from each party tend to 
support their own party and not the opposition. Table 18 reflects the model in terms of 
Democratic judges only. Problems with the data matrix forced me to drop out the state 
government as plaintiff variable. Most likely this was due to a lack of data. The model 
clearly shows that Democratic judges are more inclined to cast a partisan vote decisively 
when the Democratic Party is a defendant (significance .001, coefficient 3.05).When the 
federal government is the plaintiff there is a strong showing that the Democratic judges 
will cast a partisan vote in favor of their own party. (significance 0.021, coefficient 
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3.06).When the federal government is the defendant, Democratic judges are still inclined 
to cast a partisan vote that would favor the party at the expense of the government. 
(significance 0.032, coefficient 1.99). When state government is the defendant 
Democratic judges are more likely to support the party (significance 0.087, coefficient 
0.96). Democratic judges do not appear to support their parties’ efforts as a plaintiff 
however. Perhaps this is the one time they do not wish to appear as partisan activists by 
siding with their own party. They will protect the party, but they will not aid in its 
promotion when the party is the plaintiff.   
Finally, Table 18 indicates that Democratic judges act as partisans when the 
Republican party is involved in the litigation. Democratic judges will cast a partisan vote 
opposing the Republican party when they are plaintiffs (significance 0.007, coefficient 
2.69). We know from previous research that Democratic judges are more supportive of 
the expansion of First Amendment rights. However, this is not the case when the 
Republican party is the litigant. Democratic judges abandon their ideals, and vote 
strategically as partisans. Perhaps they are trying to weaken the Republican party which 
in turn may help strengthen the Democratic Party in the future. To a lesser extent, 
Democratic judges also vote in partisan manner when the Republicans are defendants in 
litigation (significance 0.168). Again, this is a possible indication of strategic voting. The 
model fit is good. The Chi 2 ratio is 24.06. The Pseudo R2 for the model in Table 18 is 
also higher at 0.153. While weak, this is a stronger showing than the general model 
containing both Republican and Democratic judges. 
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Table 19 reflects the results of the model for Republican judges. Again, data 
matrix problems forced me to drop the federal government as plaintiff and state 
government as plaintiff variables from the model. Nothing seems to motivate Republican 
judges to act in a partisan manner. Only two variables even approach significance. 
Republican judges appear to act in a more partisan manner when their party is being sued 
(significance 0.134). There is no indication that they support the parties’ interest when 
they are the plaintiffs. If anything, they are even less inclined than the Democrats to 
actively promote their party (significance 0.514, coefficient -.437). Of course, it is not 
surprising that a Republican judge would be less supportive of the expansion of First 
Amendment rights and would not support the expansion of the political rights of the 
party. There is no support for the Democratic Party either as a plaintiff or as a defendant. 
The only other variable approaching significance is past political experience in state 
government (significance 0.162, coefficient .61). This may hint that personal attributes 
may be of importance to the decision making process when it comes to party litigation. 
Perhaps state level political experience had more of an effect on these judges. The 
explanatory value of the model is weak because the Pseudo R2 is only .09 and the 
findings are not significant. 
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U.S. Supreme Court 







































Source: Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
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                                                          Table 3 
Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
 (By time period, in percentages) 
 
Issue Area 1925-36 1937-45 1946-60 1961-69 1970-88 
Criminal 11.8 13.3 21.1 32.3 32.3 
Civil 
Liberties 
0.5 0.8 2.6 1.9 5.0 
Civil Rights 1.2 0.9 1.9 3.9 13.5 
Public 
Economic 
31.4 37.9 31.3 24.3 25.0 
Private 
Economic 
48.5 43.6 38.4 35.2 24.5 





Party Affiliation & Partisan Vote 
All Judges 
 




































Partisan Vote & Democratic Plaintiff 
All Judges 
 
 Cases with Democratic Plaintiff 
Contra-partisan Vote 16 
42% 
Partisan Vote 22 
58% 
Total 38 cases 
 






Partisan Vote & Democratic Defendant  
All Judges 
 
 Cases with Democratic Defendant 
Contra-partisan Vote 40 
40% 
Partisan Vote 60 
60% 
Total 100 cases 




Partisan Vote & Republican Plaintiff 
All Judges 
 
 Cases with Republican  Plaintiff 
Contra-partisan Vote 24 
49% 
Partisan Vote 25 
51% 
Total 49 cases 





Partisan Vote & Republican Defendant  
All Judges 
 
 Cases with Republican  Plaintiff 
Contra-partisan Vote 24 
49% 
Partisan Vote 25 
51% 
Total 49 cases 




Partisan Vote & Democratic Plaintiff 
Democratic Judges 
 
 Cases with Democratic Plaintiff 
Contra-partisan Vote 9 
45% 
Partisan Vote 11 
55% 
Total 20 cases 
 




Partisan Vote & Democratic Defendant 
Democratic Judges 
 
 Cases with Democratic Defendant 
Contra-partisan Vote 17 
30% 
Partisan Vote 39 
70% 
Total 56 cases 
 
Pearson chi2 (1) =   5.474*      Pr = 0.019 





Partisan Vote & Republican Plaintiff 
Democratic Judges 
 
 Cases with Republican  Plaintiff 
Contra-partisan Vote 4 
25% 
Partisan Vote 12 
75% 
Total 16 cases 
 




Partisan Vote & Republican Defendant  
Democratic Judges 
 
 Cases with Republican  Defendant 
Contra-partisan Vote  23 
52% 
Partisan Vote 21 
48% 
Total 44 cases 
 





Partisan Vote & Democratic Plaintiff  
Republican Judges 
 
 Cases with Democratic  Plaintiff 
Contra-partisan Vote  7 
39% 
Partisan Vote 11 
61% 
Total 18 cases 
 




Partisan Vote & Democratic Defendant 
Republican Judges 
 
 Cases with Democratic  Defendant 
Contra-partisan Vote 23 
52% 
Partisan Vote 21 
48% 
Total 44 cases 
 




Partisan Vote & Republican Plaintiff  
Republican Judges 
 
 Cases with Republican  Pla intiff 
Contra-partisan Vote  20 
61% 
Partisan Vote 13 
39% 
Total 33 cases 
 
Pearson chi2 (1) =   5.133*     Pr = 0.023 




Partisan Vote & Republican Defendant  
Republican Judges 
 
 Cases with Republican  Defendant 
Contra-partisan Vote  17 
29% 
Partisan Vote 42 
71% 
Total 59 cases 
 
Pearson chi2 (1) =   9.922*     Pr = 0.002 




Republican & Democratic Judges 
Logit Model 
 
Partisan Vote (DV) Coefficient Standard Error P>|z| 
Party Affiliation .0872 0.277 0.753 
Region -.1480 0.302 0.625 
State Experience .1946 0.282 0.491 
Federal Experience .2793 0.302 0.356 
Federal Plaintiff 1.795 1.143 0.116 
Federal Defendant .7951 0.523 0.129 
State Plaintiff -.3433 0.884 0.698 
State Defendant .4605 0.349 0.187 
Democratic Plaintiff .2454 0.525 0.641 
Democratic Defendant .9993 0.458 0.029 
Republican Plaintiff .3108 0.502 0.536 
Republican Defendant .7353 0.422 0.082 
 
Logit estimates 
N                         =          246 
Pseudo R2           =     0.0318 








Partisan Vote (DV) Coefficient Standard Error P>|z| 
Region .2371 0.443 0.593 
State Experience -.0251 0.461 0.956 
Federal Experience .2331 0.476 0.625 
Federal Plaintiff 3.068 1.330 0.021 
Federal Defendant 1.991 0.926 0.032 
State Defendant .9652 0.563 0.087 
Democratic Plaintiff .7594 1.005 0.450 
Democratic Defendant 3.053 0.879 0.001 
Republican Plaintiff 2.69 0.998 0.007 
Republican Defendant .9611 0.696 0.168 
 
Logit estimates 
N                       =        115 
LR chi2 (10)  =     24.06  







Partisan Vote (DV) Coefficient Standard Error   P>|z| 
Region -.1633 0.525 0.756 
State Experience .6162 .0.440 0.162 
Federal Experience .1752 0.471 0.710 
Federal Defendant .0212 0.765 0.978 
State Defendant -.3117 0.535 0.560 
Democratic Plaintiff .2799 0.705 0.692 
Democratic Defendant -.2134 0.642 0.740 
Republican Plaintiff -.4371 0.669 0.514 
Republican Defendant .9215 0.614 0.134 
 
Logit estimates 
N             =         123 
LR chi2 (9) =      15.30 






Four important questions were posed at the beginning of this research. The first 
was whether or not a Republican judge will support the Republican party and vote against 
the Democratic party? Strictly looking at partisan affiliation and nothing else, Republican 
judges do not support their own party’s efforts as plaintiffs, but they are protective of 
their party when being sued as defendants. These findings are statistically significant. The 
findings about Republican judge’s actions concerning Democrats are mixed.  Republican 
judges will not vote in favor of the Democratic party when the Democrats are acting as 
plaintiffs. However, Republican judges will vote for the Democratic party when that 
party is litigating as a defendant. Neither finding however is significant. When considered 
in a multivariate Logit analysis, there is no significant finding that Republican judges will 
act in a partisan manner. 
The second question was whether or not a Democratic judge will support the 
Democratic party and vote against the Republican party? Again only looking at partisan 
affiliation, Democratic judges are more inclined to support their own party as plaintiffs, 
but the findings are not statistically significant. On the contrary, Democratic judges are 
extremely protective of their own party when it is the defendant in litigation. Democratic 
judges do not support the Republican party as a plaintiff, but the finding is not 
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significant. Interestingly though, Democratic judges are more likely to support 
Republicans as defendants.  
When considered in the multivariate Logit analysis, Democratic judges will cast a 
partisan vote in order to protect the interests of their party. This is true when the 
Democratic party is being sued by or is suing the federal government. It is also true when 
the Democratic party is suing a state government. Democratic judges will act in partisan 
manner and vote against the Republican party when they are litigating as plaintiffs.  
The third question posited was whether or not a conservative judge will sacrifice 
ideology and vote in a sophisticated manner in order to expand the civil liberties of the 
Republicans, but remain conservative if the ruling restricts the Democrats? This question 
remains unanswered.  
Finally, the fourth question posed was will a liberal judge sacrifice ideology and 
vote in a sophisticated manner in order to reign in the civil liberties of the Republicans, or 
will that judge stay ideologically true and expand their rights? This research shows that 
liberal judges, usually associated as Democrats, will abandon their ideals and vote in a 
partisan manner against the Republicans. This may be evidence of sophisticated voting. 
Liberal ideals are abandoned for the moment in order to defeat the activities of the 
Republicans. By doing so, they may able to weaken the Republican party thereby 
strengthening the Democratic party in the long run.  
Where does this research go in the future? The data stopped with cases to 1997. 
Additional years could easily be added to the database.  This would strengthen the 
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findings. Additionally, cases concerning the multitude of minor political parties could be 
added similar to the approach taken by Hadley and Epstein (1990). In doing so, a 
determination of could be made as to whether or not federal Court of Appeals judges are 
more supportive of the major parties to the detriment of the minor political parties. Such 
research would help us to better understand the nature of the dominance of the major 










Year of opinion  
Judge 
Casnum (Case number) 
JPARTY: 0=R; 1=D 
J & P of same party: 0=No, 1=Yes 
Presidential Party: 0=R; 1=D 
Appointing President of the judge 
Year Appointed  
Senate & President of Same Party: 0=No, 1=Yes 
Region Code: 0=NONSOUTH, 1=SOUTH 
SPGOVT (Prior state service) 0=No; 1=Yes 
FPGOVT (Prior federal service): 0=No, 1=Yes 
JUDGE'S VOTE: 1=PPD; 2=PPR; 3=APD;4=APR 
AP=0; PP=1: anti party / pro party 
Cons=0; Lib=1 (conservative/liberal opinion) 
Both Party Litigants: No=0; Both Plaint.=1; Both Def.=2; Opp. sides =3 
Dem. Plaint/Def: Dem.: Pty. Not Involved=0; DPty.Plaint.=1; DPty.Def.=2 
Rep.  Plaint/Def: Rep. Pty. Not Involved=0; RPtyPlaint.=1; RPty.Def.=2 
Fedgovplaint: 0=No; 1=Yes 
Fedgovdef: 0=No, 1=Yes 
Statgovplaint: 0=No, 1=Yes 
Statgovdef: 0=No, 1=Yes 
Case Subject:  1=Party Org./Structure 
2=Membership 
            3=Delegate Selection 
            4=Fundraising & Finance 
             5=Campaign Activities 
            6=Patronage 
             7=Ballot Access 
            8=Reapportionment 
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APPENDIX B 
CITATION FOR EACH CASE 
 
 
122 F3D 192 (Jordahl v. D Pty of Va.) (3 votes) 
113 F3D 1114 (Johnson v. Knowles) (3votes) 
108 F3D 413 (Common Cause v. FEC) (3votes) 
104 F3D 965 (Stewart v. Taylor) (2 votes) 
87 F3D 1226 (Duke v. Massey) (3 votes) 
78 F3D 44 (Rockefeller v. Powers) (3votes) 
76 F3D 400 (RNC v. FEC) (2 votes) 
74 F3D 1367 (Rockefeller v. Powers) (3votes) 
59 F3D 1015 (FEC v. Colo. R Fed Cmpgn. Comm.) (3 votes) 
49 F3D 1289 (RP Kansas v. Faulkner County) (3 votes) 
43 F3D 1126 (LaPorte Co. R Central Comm v. Board of Comm) 
(3votes) 
19 F3D 873 (Marks v. Stinson) (2 votes) 
13 F3D 412 (Freedom Republicans v. FEC) (3 votes) 
5 F3D 1399 (Duke v. Cleland) ( 3votes) 
983 F2D 587 (Arlington Co. Rep. Com. V. Arlington County) (3votes) 
980 F2D 943 (Rpty NCar v. Martin) (3 votes) 
966 F2D 1471 (FEC v. NRSC) ( 3 votes) 
959 F2D 144 (RP Oregon v. Keisling) ( 3 votes) 
956 F2D 172 (Pulaski CTY Rep Comm v. Pulaski CO. Bd. Of Elect. 
Comm.) ( 3 votes) 
941 F2D 224 (Trinsey v. Com. Of Penn.) ( 3 votes) 
919 F2D 455 (Shakman v. Dem. Org. of Cook County) ( 3 votes) 
906 F2D 705 (Common Cause v. FEC) ( 3 votes) 
902 F2D 15 (Whitfield v. Dem. Party of the State of Ark.) ( 10 votes) 
899 F2D 251 (Heitmanis v. Austin) ( 3  votes) 
898 F2D 1192 (Banchy v. R Party Hamilton Co) ( 3 votes) 
898 F2D 870 (Igneri v. Moore) ( 3 votes) 
890 F2D 1423 (Whitfield v. Dem. Party of the State of Ark.) ( 3 votes) 
868 F2D 943 (Rutan v. Rep. Pty. Illinois) ( 9 votes) 
848 F2D 1396 (Rutan v. Rep. Pty. Illinois) ( 3 votes) 
836 F2D 837 (Bachur v. Democratic Nat'l. Party.) ( 3 votes) 
831 F2D 1131 (Dem. Cong. Cmpgn. Comm. V. FEC) ( 3 votes) 
826 F2D 814 (S.F. Co. Dem. Cent. Comm. V. Eu) ( 3 votes) 
821 F2D 31 (Kay v. N.H. D. Pty.) ( 3 votes) 
812 F2D 1194 (Monterrey Co. De. Central Comm. V. USPS) ( 3 votes) 
802 F2D 1302 (Curry v. Baker {State Demo. Chair}) ( 3 votes) 
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795 F2D 190 (Nat.Rcong Comm. V. Legi-Tech Corp.) ( 3 votes) 
792 F2D 802 (SF County Dem. Central Comm v. Eu, Sec. of State of 
Calif.) ( 3 votes) 
770 F2D 265 (Rep. Party of State of Conn. V. Tashjian. Sec. of State) (3 
votes) 
769 F2D 24 (Hopfman v. Connolly)  ( 3 votes) 
766 F2D 337 (McIntosh v. Ark Rep. Party ; Ark. State Police) ( 3 votes) 
746 F2D 97 (Hopfman v. Connoly) ( 3 votes) 
722 F2D 1307 (Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County) ( 3 
votes) 
719 F2D 1072 (Wymbs v. Rep. State Exec. Comm. Of Fla.) ( 3 votes) 
717 F2D 1471 (DNC v. FCC) ( 3 votes) 
712 F2D 165 (Riddell v. NDP) ( 3 votes) 
675 F2D 1212 (Harris v. Conradi) ( 3 votes) 
660 F2D 773 (Dem. Se. Campaign Comm. V. FEC) ( 3 votes) 
658 F2D 324 (Wymbs v. Rep. State Exec. Comm. Of Fla.) (3 votes) 
624 F2D 539 (Riddell v. NDP) ( 2 votes) 
616 F2D 1 (RNC v. FEC) ( 10 votes) 
609 F2D 10 (Ward Three Demo. Comm. V. U.S.) ( 3 votes) 
538 F2D 349 (Chisolm v. FCC) ( 3 votes) 
533 F2D 344 (Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County) ( 3 votes) 
525 F2D 567 (Ripon Society v. NRP {en banc}) ( 10 votes) 
525 F2D 548 (Ripon Society v. NRP) ( 3 votes) 
514 F2D 1168 (Sumter County De. Exec. Comm. V. Dearman) ( 3 
votes) 
508 F2D 770  (Riddell v. NDP) ( 3 votes) 
502 F2D 1123 (Redfearn v. Deleware Rep. State Comm.) ( 3 votes) 
500 F2D 1307 (Siff v. State (Tx.) Democratic Exec. Comm.) ( 3 votes) 
475 F2D 1287 (Keane v. NDP) ( 3 votes) 
469 F2D 563 (Brown v. O'Brien) ( 3 votes) 
469 F2D 563 PART II (Brown v. O'brien) ( 3 votes) 
460 F2D 913 (DNC v. FCC) ( 3 votes) 
460 F2D 250 (NYState Dem. Party v. Lomenzo {NY S of S}) ( 2 votes) 
459 F2D 308 (Seergy v. Kings Co. Rep. Co. Comm.) ( 4 votes) 
454 F2D 1018 (CBS v. FCC) ( 3 votes) 
452 F2D 1302 (Bode v. DNP) (3 votes) 
447 F2D 1271 (Georgia v. NDP) (3 votes) 
435 F2D 487 (Gilmore v. Greene Co. Demo. Party Exec. Comm.) ( 3 
votes) 
435 F2D 267 (Shakman v. Demo. Org. of Cook Co.) ( 3 votes) 
386 F2D 979 (Smith v. Paris) ( 3 votes) 
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370 F2D 919 (Gilmore v. Greene Co. Demo. Party. Exec. Comm.) ( 3 
votes) 
368 F2D 328  (Gilmore v. Greene Co. Demo. Party Exec. Comm.) ( 3 
votes) 
362 F2D 60 (Miss. Freedom Democratic Party v. Democratic Party of 






Abramson, Paul R., John H. Aldrich, Phil Paolino, and David W. Rohde. 1992.  
“‘Sophisticated’  Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries.” American  
Political Science Review 86: 55-79.  
 
Adamany, David W. 1969. “The Party Variable in Judge’s Voting: Conceptual  
Notes and a Case Study.” American Political Science Review 63:57-73. 
 
Aldrich, John H., and Forrest D. Nelson. 1984. Linear Probability, Logit, and  
Probit Models. University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social 
Sciences, no. 07-045. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
Allison, Graham T. 1971. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile  
Crisis. Boston: Harper Collins. 
 
Baum, Lawrence. 1997. The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior. Ann Arbor: The  
University of Michigan Press. 
 
______________. 2001. The Supreme Court, 7th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
Black, Benjamin D. 1996. “Developments in the State Regulations of Major and  
Minor Political Parties.” Cornell Law Review 82: 109-181. 
 
Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleischer. 1990. The President in the Legislative  
Arena. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Brace, Paul, and Melinda Gann Hall, 1995. “Studying the Courts  
Comparatively: The View from the American States.” Political  
Research Quarterly 48:5-29. 
 
Calvert, Randall L., and Richard Fenno, Jr. 1994. “Strategy and Sophisticated  
Voting in the Senate.” Journal of Politics 56: 349-376. 
 
Campbell, Angus, Phillip Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes.  
1960. The American Voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
 77
Carp, Robert A., and C.K. Rowland. 1983. Policymaking and Politics in the  
Federal District Courts. Knoxville, Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press. 
 
Clausen, Aage. R. 1973. How Congressmen Decide: a Policy Focus. New York:  
St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Denzau, Arthur T., and Robert J. Mackay. 1983. “Gatekeeping and Monopoly  
Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior.” 
American Journal of Political Science 27:740-761. 
 
Enelow, James M., and David H. Koehler. 1980. “The Amendment in  
Legislative Strategy: Sophisticated Voting in the U.S. Congress.” Journal of 
Politics 42:396-413. 
 
Epstein, Lee, and Charles D. Hadley. 1990. “On the Treatment of Political  
Parties in the United States Supreme Court, 1900-1986.” Journal of Politics 
52:413-426. 
 
Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 1998. The Choices Justices Make. 
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press 
 
Epstein, Lee, and C.K. Rowland. 1991. “Debunking the Myth of Interest Group  
Invincibility in the Courts.” American Political Science Review 85: 205-217. 
 
Epstein, Leon D. 1986. Political Parties in the American Mold. Madison,  
Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Feeley, Malcolm, 1971. “Another Look at the Party Variable in Judicial  
Decision Making: An Analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court.” Polity 4:91-104. 
 
Fitts, Michael A. 2000. “Back to the Future: The Enduring Dilemma  
Revealed in the Supreme Court’s Treatment of Political Parties” in The U.S. 
Supreme Court and the Electoral Process.  David K. Ryden, ed. Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press.  
 
Flanigan, William H., and Nancy H. Zingale. 1998. Political Behavior  






Frendreis, John, and Alan R. Gitelson, 1999. “Local Parties in the  
1990’s: Spokes in a Candidate Centered Wheel” in The State of the Parties: The 
Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties. 3rd Ed. Edited by John C. 
Green and Daniel M. Shea. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc. 
 
Galanter, Marc. 1974. “Why the Haves Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of  
 Social Change.”  Law and Society Review 9:95-160. 
 
Gibson, James L., 1991. “The Role Concept in Judicial Research.” Law and 
Policy Quarterly 3:291-311. 
 
___________ ____ . 1991 “Decision Making in Appellate Courts” in The  
American Courts: A Critical Assessment, edited by John B. Gates and Charles A. 
Johnson. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
Goldman, Sheldon. 1966. “Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of  
Appeals, 1961-1964.” American Political Science Review 60: 374-383. 
 
__________________. 1975. “Voting Behavior on the United States Court of Appeals  
 Revisited.” American Political Science Review 69:491-506. 
  
Humphries, Martha Anne, and Donald R. Songer. 1999. “Law and Politics in  
Judicial Oversight of Federal Administrative Agencies.” Journal of Politics 
61:207-220. 
 
Kingdon, John W. 1981. Congressmen’s Voting Decisions, 2nd ed. New York:  
Harper and Row. 
 
Krehbiel, Keith, and Douglas Rivers. 1990. “Sophisticated Voting in Congress:  
A Reconsideration.” Journal of Politics 52: 548-578. 
 
Lloyd, Randall. 1995. “Separating Partisanship From Party in Judicial  
Research: Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts.” American Political 
Science Review 89:413-420. 
 
McCleskey, Clifton. 1984. “Parties at the Bar: Equal Protection, Freedom of 




Nagel, Stuart S. 1961. “Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions.” American 
Political Science Review 55:843-850. 
 
Niemi, Richard G., and Herbert F. Weisberg. 1993. Controversies in Voting  
Behavior, 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
Pampel, Fred C. 2000. Logistic Regression: a Primer. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage  
 Publications. 
 
Petterson, Paul R. 2000.  “Partisan Autonomy or State Regulatory Authority? The  
Court as Mediator.” The U.S. Supreme Court and the Electoral Process.  David 
K. Ryden, Ed. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.  
 
Pritchett, C. Herman. 1984. Constitutional Civil Liberties. Santa Barbara,  
California: University of California Press. 
 
Rotunda, Ronald. D., and John E. Nowak. 1999. Treatise on Constitutional Law, 3rd. ed.  
St. Paul, Minnesota: West Group. 
 
Rowland, C.K., and Robert A. Carp. 1996. Politics and Judgment in Federal  
District Courts. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press. 
 
Rowland, C.K., Robert A. Carp, and R.A. Stidham. 1984. “Judges’ Policy  
Choices and the Value Basis of Judicial Appointments: A Comparison of Support 
for Criminal Defendants Among Nixon, Johnson, and Kennedy Appointees to the 
Federal District Courts.” Journal of Politics 46:886-902. 
 
Ryden, David K. 1999. “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Judicial  
Shaping of Party Activities” in the State of the Parties: The Changing Role of 
Contemporary American Parties. 3rd ed. edited by John C. Green and Daniel M. 
Shea. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
 
_____________. 2000. “Political Parties: The Key to or the Scourge of  
Representation?” in the U.S. Supreme Court and the Electoral Process. David K. 
Ryden, ed. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Sabato, Larry J. 1988. The Party’s Just Begun. Glenview, Illinois: Scott Foresman. 
 
Scheppele, Kim Lane, and Jack L. Walker, Jr. 1991. “The Litigation Strategies of  
Interest Groups.” In Mobilizing Interest Groups in America by Jack L. Walker, Jr. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 80
 
Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 1993. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal  
Model. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sheehan, Reginald S. 1990. “Administrative Agencies and the Court: A  
Reexamination of the Impact of Agency Type on Decisional Outcomes. Western 
Political Quarterly 43:875-885. 
 
Songer, Donald R. 1991. “The Circuit Courts of Appeal in the American  
Courts: A Critical Assessment” in The American Courts: A Critical Assessment, 
edited by John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
Songer, Donald R., and Sue Davis. 1990. “The Impact of Party and Region on  
Voting Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1955-1986.” Western 
Political Quarterly 43: 317-334. 
 
Songer, Donald R., and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1992. “Who Wins on Appeal?  
Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Court of Appeals.” American 
Journal of Political Science 36: 235-238. 
 
Songer, Donald R., Reginald Sheehan and Susan B. Haire. 2000. Continuity and Change  
on the United States Court of Appeals. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
 
Stidham, Robert and Robert A. Carp. 1982. “Trial Courts’ Responses to 
Supreme Court Policy Changes: Three Case Studies.” Law and Policy Quarterly 
4:222-227. 
 
Tate, C. Neal 1981. “Personal Attribute Models of Voting Behavior of U.S.  
Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 
1946-1975.” American Political Science Review 75:355-367. 
 
Tate, C. Neal, and Roger Handberg, 1991. “Time Binding and Theory  
 Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting  
Behavior, 1916-1988.”American Journal of Political Science 35:460-480. 
 
Willison, David H. 1986. “Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions:  
Agency Cases before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,  
1981-1984.” American Politics Quarterly 14:317-327. 
 
